My comments today are related to the Gifford Lectures of Stanley Hauerwas which were printed in book form under the title of “With the Grain of the Universe.” (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001) What particularly strikes me in the lectures is the juxtaposition of the three individuals Hauerwas focuses upon in the lectures: William James, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth.
These three thinkers, I believe, are representative of the point that Hauerwas wants to make in the lectures concerning the outcome of the debate over modernity. He begins with William James, for James, the pragmatist, follows the path of “experience.” That is, pragmatists apply the “scientific model” to their thinking process, which in a more general form can be referred to as Inductive Inference.
Inductive Inference is a process of “model” testing that always ends up comparing the predictions of a particular model against the outcomes of the decisions an individual has actually pursued. Thus, “experience” is an important part of the process.
I use the term model here as a “catch all” term that includes not only formal models used in making forecasts but also the less formal or less explicit means people use in decision making or problem solving like stories, rules of thumb, or other narrative forms.
If the outcomes are consistent with the predictions then an individual can continue to use the model in its current form. However, if the outcomes are not consistent with the predictions, then the model needs to be modified in order to make better predictions the next time the individual needs to use the model.
Note that not all models directly need to result in a “decision” or an “action”. Models are use to “explain” things, like historical events or how things fit together. Models are also the tools that humans use to try and make sense of things, to present a worldview, or to justify an action.
Models, whether formal or informal in nature, begin with assumptions. That is, assumptions must be made that serve as the foundational material for the construction of the model. The assumptions may be realistic…or they may not be realistic. And, this is where problems come into the picture.
Milton Friedman, the well-known Nobel prize winning economist, wrote, in a very famous essay on “positive economics”, that the reality of the assumptions of a model were really not the issue concerning the value or usefulness of a model. The usefulness of the model was determined by how well the model forecast or how well the model was able to explain events. Just to change a model on the basis that the assumptions of the model were unrealistic was not sufficient.
The Catholic theologian David Tracy has written that the deciding factor about models is their “relative adequacy.” By “relative adequacy” Tracy meant that a model was logically consistent and predicted at least as well as did any other logically consistent theory. The choice of assumptions has a lot to do with whether or not the model is logically consistent. The real “test” of the mode was its ability to predict.
Pragmatism, however, can get caught up in a concern about reality, about a person’s “experience”. The essence of pragmatism is that it works, it helps people solve more and more difficult problems, make better decisions, and it helps people understand history better. The primary focus, therefore, needs to be on the results.
On the other hand, people can transfer their focus to the assumptions of a model. People can look at the assumptions and say that the assumptions don’t conform to reality…to “experience.” Thus, even though the models may be helpful and contribute to successful decision making and problem solving, people may try to change the assumptions because they are not “realistic.” This is where trouble can creep in.
Once people begin focusing upon the assumptions of a model, generally the questioning of the reality of the assumptions will continue. The only place this process can end up is where all the assumptions are “realistic” and that usually leaves you with a model that predicts little or nothing.
This, to me, is what Hauerwas is getting at in his criticisms of modernity. The thinkers of modernity have focused upon the realism of the assumptions of models because they do not conform to their “experience” and so “water-down” models regardless of whether or not they make good predictions. And, this has very significant consequences for their thinking. All models turn out to be deficient. That is, there is no “truth”.
Hauerwas contends that Protestant liberals attempt to ground their knowledge of God in experience…in reality. (page 158) This grounding has led to their questioning the assumptions of the more “orthodox” Reformation model of Christian thinking. True to modernity, once the questioning of assumptions begins, the questioning continues and the model begins to deteriorate. Oh, yes, the “realism” brought into the discussion seems to be called for and, at least in the short run, seems to make the model more consistent with reality. However, once the challenge to the model becomes paramount the result is a kind of nihilism.
The problem is that the focus on the model has shifted from the ability of the model to help solve more and more difficult problems or allow for better decisions to be made. The focus of the model is now on the realism of the model.
This leads Hauerwas to conclude that “the difference between Niebuhr and Barth is exactly the difference between a theology that has given up on its ability to tell us the way the world is and a theology that confidently and unapologetically proclaims the way things are.” (page 21)
Within this context, the Protestant liberal bets all his/her cards on “reason” or the following of “humanistic” ends, and loses the skill to make known to themselves and to make known to others exactly what they believe about how the world works and how things are.
Barth, Hauerwas contends, “did not try to ‘explain’ the truth of what Christians believe about God and God’s creation. He understood that such an explanation could not help but give the impression that the explanation is more important than the witness.” (page 146)
To Hauerwas, “Barth’s convictions were tested by their ability to sustain service to God.” (page 40) That is, the test of any set of convictions, the test of any model is “does it work in practice.” In this case, the test of the convictions is in witness!
“Christians can be no more than witnesses.” (page 16)
Thus, the models people rely on must work. Focus must not be upon the assumptions or the reality behind the assumptions…focus must be upon the consequences of having faith in the model.
It is easy to destroy people’s belief by challenging the reality behind that belief. Modernity has been very good at this. In fact, that is the one thing that modernity excels in.
But, this does not make all models of equal value. Some models predict better than other models. Some models, as David Tracy contend, are relatively adequate. Some of these models are integral to the Christian story and Christian history. We need to have faith in these models if we are to solve more and more difficult problems and to make better decisions. That is the experience that really counts.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Barth on Dogmatics--Commentary 1
Karl Barth begins his “Dogmatics in Outline” by writing, “Dogmatics is a science.”
Whoa! What does he mean by this?
“In every science an object is involved and a sphere of activity. In no science is it a matter of pure theory or pure practice; on the one hand, theory comes in, but also, on the other hand, practice is guided by this theory.”
Perhaps we get all tied up in knots because he uses the term “science” and then attempts to relate dogmatics to the well-known perception of science that we are all familiar with involving experiments and tests and other “hands on” things.
But, he says here that science is not just theory but it is also practice as well. That is, we cannot focus on just one or the other. These two components of a “science” are “combined at the hip” in his view and cannot be separated.
Maybe we have a problem with this comparison because of the time that Barth gave the original lectures, in 1947. At that time, science was considered by many people to be a field of its own, something separate and distinct from theology or the humanities or “soft” stuff. At that time, many believed that a field could be only one or the other and science was the one field that could provide “proofs”.
I believe that the times have changed and what Barth says is more acceptable to more people now than it was way back then. First of all, however, I would change his emphasis on trying to claim that dogmatics is a science. In my view, dogmatics or theology has arisen because of the basic human capacity to solve problems, to make decisions.
In this respect, dogmatics, like physics or chemistry or biology, is an effort by humans to solve more and more difficult problems or to make better decisions. In all of this, humans begin with a question. For example, “Why do apples fall to the ground when they drop from trees?” Or, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”
To answer this, humans build models, formal or information, or other systematic ways of trying to explain what happens. In building these models humans are looking for ways to predict outcomes. They want to predict outcomes so that they can solve a problem or make a decision. Practice or action is in the picture.
Of course, a science like physics can be very abstract, mathematically based, and logically consistent. But, models can be very common place and ordinary. Rules of thumb may result from human model building. Stories or narratives can result from human model building. Models and schema can take all kinds of different forms and still be exceedingly useful to human beings.
When Barth was writing these lectures, the general feeling was that science was abstract, mathematically based, and logically consistent. If a model did not fit this criterion then it was not considered a part of a science.
Now, however, we consider that narratives can be just as helpful to humans in problem solving or decision making as can formal, logically consistent mathematical models. In fact, it is clear that humans use models constructed around stories or narratives far more in their lives than they do these other kinds of models. We know now that the same process is involved in either approach. We give this approach another fancy name: we call this process of model building inductive inference and it is something that people use constantly in all the things they are doing in their lives.
In more formal situations, people can this approach the scientific method. In other situations people just call this problem solving. It is the process a question is ask, information that is hopefully relevant is collected, and then an effort is made to induce, from the information, so kind of model that can make predictions. The model is then used to make forecasts in specific situations. If the model builder does not feel very confident about the model at this point, more information can be collected. Then an action is taken, given the model.
The final step in this iteration of the process is to compare the predictions the model has produced with the outcome of the action. If the outcome is relatively close to the predictions, then the model-builder will go ahead and use the model again in the future. If the outcome is significantly different from the prediction then the model-builder will make alterations to the model so that a better forecast can be forthcoming next time the model is used.
This process is continued, iteration after iteration, until the model ceases to be useful or until other questions are asked. Then the model-building process begins again.
The crucial thing is that this process of inductive inference is a normal human process that has been a major part of the evolution of the species. Human’s problem solving capabilities separate this species from all the others. These capabilities apply to physics and to dogmatics. Therefore, what Barth claims for dogmatics, I believe, is true.
There are other parts to what Barth writes, however. For one, the models human beings construct are fallible. “No act of man can claim to be more than an attempt (at comprehension and exposition, at investigation and instruction), not even science.”
And, Barth states that “By describing it as an attempt, we are simply stating its nature as preliminary and limited.” He goes on: “we are under no illusion that anything man can do can ever be an undertaking of supreme wisdom and final art.”
“Christian dogmatics is an attempt—an attempt to understand and an attempt to expound, an attempt to see, to hear, and to state definite facts, to survey and co-ordinate these facts, to present them in the form of a doctrine (a model).”
Our models are incomplete and fallible…in physics, in economics, in theology, in whatever. The test of our models is practice…we must act using the predictions or forecasts we derive from our models. Theory, just believing in your model is in not enough. This is the “pure theory” that Barth talks about “on the one hand.”
The models must allow us to solve more and more difficult or make better decisions. The models must be put into practice “on the other hand.” Theory (dogma) is not useful unless it works in practice, but practice without theory (dogma) is meaningless. The final test of the model and the theory is whether or not it works when one acts on it.
David Tracy, the Roman Catholic theologian, defines a model as relatively adequate when it is logically consistent and can predict at least as well an any other logically consistent model that is relevant for the situation at hand. Our dogmatics must be relatively adequate.
Theology, dogmatics, is a human activity. In this respect it is like physics and chemistry and biology. Barth then concludes, “So by dogmatics we understand this twofold activity of investigation and doctrine in relation to an object and a sphere of activity.” Barth continues by defining the object of dogmatics and the sphere of activity. A discussion of this will follow.
Whoa! What does he mean by this?
“In every science an object is involved and a sphere of activity. In no science is it a matter of pure theory or pure practice; on the one hand, theory comes in, but also, on the other hand, practice is guided by this theory.”
Perhaps we get all tied up in knots because he uses the term “science” and then attempts to relate dogmatics to the well-known perception of science that we are all familiar with involving experiments and tests and other “hands on” things.
But, he says here that science is not just theory but it is also practice as well. That is, we cannot focus on just one or the other. These two components of a “science” are “combined at the hip” in his view and cannot be separated.
Maybe we have a problem with this comparison because of the time that Barth gave the original lectures, in 1947. At that time, science was considered by many people to be a field of its own, something separate and distinct from theology or the humanities or “soft” stuff. At that time, many believed that a field could be only one or the other and science was the one field that could provide “proofs”.
I believe that the times have changed and what Barth says is more acceptable to more people now than it was way back then. First of all, however, I would change his emphasis on trying to claim that dogmatics is a science. In my view, dogmatics or theology has arisen because of the basic human capacity to solve problems, to make decisions.
In this respect, dogmatics, like physics or chemistry or biology, is an effort by humans to solve more and more difficult problems or to make better decisions. In all of this, humans begin with a question. For example, “Why do apples fall to the ground when they drop from trees?” Or, “Why is there something rather than nothing?”
To answer this, humans build models, formal or information, or other systematic ways of trying to explain what happens. In building these models humans are looking for ways to predict outcomes. They want to predict outcomes so that they can solve a problem or make a decision. Practice or action is in the picture.
Of course, a science like physics can be very abstract, mathematically based, and logically consistent. But, models can be very common place and ordinary. Rules of thumb may result from human model building. Stories or narratives can result from human model building. Models and schema can take all kinds of different forms and still be exceedingly useful to human beings.
When Barth was writing these lectures, the general feeling was that science was abstract, mathematically based, and logically consistent. If a model did not fit this criterion then it was not considered a part of a science.
Now, however, we consider that narratives can be just as helpful to humans in problem solving or decision making as can formal, logically consistent mathematical models. In fact, it is clear that humans use models constructed around stories or narratives far more in their lives than they do these other kinds of models. We know now that the same process is involved in either approach. We give this approach another fancy name: we call this process of model building inductive inference and it is something that people use constantly in all the things they are doing in their lives.
In more formal situations, people can this approach the scientific method. In other situations people just call this problem solving. It is the process a question is ask, information that is hopefully relevant is collected, and then an effort is made to induce, from the information, so kind of model that can make predictions. The model is then used to make forecasts in specific situations. If the model builder does not feel very confident about the model at this point, more information can be collected. Then an action is taken, given the model.
The final step in this iteration of the process is to compare the predictions the model has produced with the outcome of the action. If the outcome is relatively close to the predictions, then the model-builder will go ahead and use the model again in the future. If the outcome is significantly different from the prediction then the model-builder will make alterations to the model so that a better forecast can be forthcoming next time the model is used.
This process is continued, iteration after iteration, until the model ceases to be useful or until other questions are asked. Then the model-building process begins again.
The crucial thing is that this process of inductive inference is a normal human process that has been a major part of the evolution of the species. Human’s problem solving capabilities separate this species from all the others. These capabilities apply to physics and to dogmatics. Therefore, what Barth claims for dogmatics, I believe, is true.
There are other parts to what Barth writes, however. For one, the models human beings construct are fallible. “No act of man can claim to be more than an attempt (at comprehension and exposition, at investigation and instruction), not even science.”
And, Barth states that “By describing it as an attempt, we are simply stating its nature as preliminary and limited.” He goes on: “we are under no illusion that anything man can do can ever be an undertaking of supreme wisdom and final art.”
“Christian dogmatics is an attempt—an attempt to understand and an attempt to expound, an attempt to see, to hear, and to state definite facts, to survey and co-ordinate these facts, to present them in the form of a doctrine (a model).”
Our models are incomplete and fallible…in physics, in economics, in theology, in whatever. The test of our models is practice…we must act using the predictions or forecasts we derive from our models. Theory, just believing in your model is in not enough. This is the “pure theory” that Barth talks about “on the one hand.”
The models must allow us to solve more and more difficult or make better decisions. The models must be put into practice “on the other hand.” Theory (dogma) is not useful unless it works in practice, but practice without theory (dogma) is meaningless. The final test of the model and the theory is whether or not it works when one acts on it.
David Tracy, the Roman Catholic theologian, defines a model as relatively adequate when it is logically consistent and can predict at least as well an any other logically consistent model that is relevant for the situation at hand. Our dogmatics must be relatively adequate.
Theology, dogmatics, is a human activity. In this respect it is like physics and chemistry and biology. Barth then concludes, “So by dogmatics we understand this twofold activity of investigation and doctrine in relation to an object and a sphere of activity.” Barth continues by defining the object of dogmatics and the sphere of activity. A discussion of this will follow.
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