Putnam's "Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life"

The “classic” revelations of the Jewish/Christian tradition were repeated by Jesus in response to the question, “Teacher, which commandment is the greatest?” Jesus replied: “’You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.’ This is the greatest and the first commandment. And, the second is like it, ‘You shall lover your neighbor as yourself.” Then, Jesus adds, “On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.” (Matthew 22: 37-40) Last week I discussed how difficult these commandments are in that they have required the work of all the law and the prophets, as well as the work of more than two thousand years of theological reflection to try and ‘interpret’ or ‘explain’ what it means to ‘love God’ and ‘to love your neighbor as yourself.’

This week I review a wonderful little book by Hilary Putnam, “Jewish Philosophy as a Guide to Life” (Published by Indiana University Press in 2008) in which we discover that the need to ‘interpret’ and ‘explain’ how to ‘love of God’ and to ‘love of neighbor and self’ is alive and well in the twenty-first century (C. E.). Putnam, a well-know philosopher in his own right, examines the work of three Jewish religious philosophers, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas, as well as the religious thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The thrust of all four philosophers, as argued by Putnam, is to express these two major commandments within the context of twentieth century philosophy.

These philosophers agree that we need to get away from metaphysics, for metaphysics is a search for the “essence” of things. In metaphysics, the philosopher “seeks an imaginary position, one outside the flow of time. He seeks to view everything, even himself, as if he were an ‘outsider’ and seeks to view the world as if he were not in it.” (p. 28) But this is not the philosophy we are involved in Rosenzweig argues, we need “another sort of philosophy.” (p. 19) Man needs “a proper relation to God” as well as “a proper relation to other human beings or to the world.” (p. 26) Putnam suggests that “our task is to acknowledge God” but, as Rosenzweig believes, “one can acknowledge any one of the three—God, Man, and World—as they demand to be acknowledged unless one acknowledges the other two.” (p. 26) This leads to the conclusion, also reached by Wittgenstein, that “religious belief…it’s really a way of living, or a way of assessing life. It’s passionately seizing hold of this interpretation.” (p. 27)

In terms of the existence of God, Putnam writes that “we construct our images of God in response to demands that we do not create” but that “for a religious person theorizing about God is beside the point.” (p. 6) He quotes Buber: “Man receives, and what he receives is not a ‘content’ but a presence, a presence of strength.” (p. 6): and he continues, with Wittgenstein, that “religion is a deep-going way of life.” (p. 11) One must maintain, Putnam argues, the ancient idea of transforming one’s way of life and one’s understanding of one’s place in the larger scheme of things and in the human community…” (p. 13) As with Pascal, one must see one’s religious continuity as a way of life, to be learned, studied, and lived.

In order to move into this community, Rosenzweig contends that we need to continually think as if we were with another person. We must ‘speak’ to some one and think for some one. This makes a person live philosophical or theological problems. We need ‘readiness’ rather than ‘plans.’ By being ‘ready’ we can respond to another person. If we have plans, we are not listening to another because we already have determined a pathway. (pgs. 31-33) Our existence within the community allows for this listening and learning.

We “are always in the presence of God” and, therefore, there is “essentially just one commandment, the commandment to love God.” (pgs. 35-36) Revelation is always ‘an event between the two.’ Thus, a ‘religious experience’ is known ‘again and again’—“For we know it only when—we do.” (pgs. 42-43) For God calls us to love him…and we respond “Here I am!” We do not always hear this voice saying “love me”, but it is there. (pgs. 46-7) The request is for us to step outside of ourselves, to enter into relationship.

However, this is the hardest thing to do. Rosenzweig continues that “the tragedy that threatens everyone, the tragedy of being completely enclosed in oneself” is “the greatest danger facing the soul.” (p. 47) “Once one becomes God’s lover, however, one can no longer be completely enclosed in oneself, but one cannot escape that fate simply by returning God’s love…To return God’s love properly involves imitation dei—‘Be thou holy, for I the lord thy God am holy’…love of God cannot have a, so to speak, ‘vertical dimension’ without a ‘horizontal dimension’; ‘love of God’ without a direction out to other fellow human beings is not really love of God at all.” (p. 48) “I have to be able to love each and every human being as a human being.” (p. 49) “To sum up: the whole purpose of human life is revelation, and the whole content of revelation is love.” (p. 54)

Buber sees these relationships as a dynamic interaction, between God and a person as well as between a person and the world. This is captured by the I—thou relation. But, the relationship between God and a person is one that can only be of short duration. The important thing is that once one has experienced this connection the “It—World” relationship is transformed. It transforms not only the individual’s interior life but it also transforms the person’s social life. The experience of the divine is not an end in itself…but the end is the transformation of life in the world. (p. 64) One cannot describe God or theorize about him. One can only enter into an “I—You” relation with God and become transformed. (p. 65) Buber argues that you can never answer the question, “How do you know that God exists?” The “I—You” relation is never a matter of knowledge. The “I—You” relation is a shared relation, a mode of being, that can transform one’s life even when one is back in the “It” world. (p. 67) So we believe in God and therefore act in the image of God which brings us into closer relationship with God. It is a cumulative thing!

But, Levinas argues that one cannot act according to a formula such as “Behave in such and such a way…” This is a disaster because it says “treat the other as an end and not as a means…” (p. 70) and this, basically, assumes that all people are “fundamentally the same.” (p. 71) Levinas attempts to describe the “fundamental obligation of one person to the other” (p. 73): he states that the fundamental obligation we have is the obligation to make ourselves available to the neediness of the other person. (p. 74) Levinas goes on to say that to be a human being in the normative sense involves recognizing that I am commanded to say ‘Here I am’ to the other. “If you have to ask, ‘Why should I put myself out for him/her?’ you are not yet human.” (p. 75) “A genuine ethical relation to another presupposes that you realize that the other person is an independent reality and not in any way your construction.” (p. 78) And, this fundamental obligation is not derivable from any metaphysical or epistemological picture.” (p. 80) The bottom line is: “every human being is responsible for every other.” (p. 81) This is an ideal, Levinas admits, but without an ideal everything becomes mediocre.

As mentioned above, by being in the community we can come to perceive a ‘trace’ of God’s presence in the tradition of the Commandment and the interpretative community that continues to work out what the Commandment means. But, the individual in the community must feel a profound experience of being Commanded by a God with whom she or he has not had a numinous experience. (p. 86) The ‘human truths’ of the Old Testament as interpreted by Levinas are (1) every human being should experience him/herself as commanded to be available to the neediness, the suffering, the vulnerability of the other person; (2) know that, philosophically, they cannot gain an account of how this is possible; and (3) know that the divine command lacks a metaphysical basis and is not based on a personal epiphany. (pgs. 86-7) This obligation of the individual exists without the feeling that the other has the same obligation. (p. 96)
Putnam does contend that in this argument Levinas leaves out one major point about love: Levinas does not consider the love that an individual should have for themselves. Putnam argues that one cannot love others if one does not love oneself. (p. 99) Putnam claims Aristotle as his teacher on this point.

Reading this book, one certainly feels that the effort to explain the ‘love of God’ and the ‘love of neighbor’ is alive and in good hands.