“There would be no dogmatics and there would perhaps be no theology at all, unless the Church’s task consisted centrally in the proclamation of the Gospel in witness to the Word spoken by God.”
“Exactly halfway between exegesis and practical theology stands dogmatics…”
“In dogmatics our question is: What are we to think and say (and do)?”
I add the “and do” to the last quotation because, historically, the Church has gotten so tied up in what it says without backing up what is said by actions. I believe that this is what Barth is after in his work: the answer the question “How is it we should live?”
The initial form of the question fits more into the historical discussion of theology and dogmatics, but I believe this is the reason why we have focused on developing programs within the Church and not with developing missional activity. I define missional activity as living in a way that reveals the “image of God.”
This to me is what “the proclamation of the Gospel in witness” is all about. It is about living…which includes both speaking and acting. And, I believe, that by acting in a way that is more consistent with our speaking is a more powerful message than just telling other people what our message is. I believe that this is what Barth is telling us.
From this, one can interpret the statement that dogmatics is “halfway” between exegesis and practical theology. Exegesis can be defined as “explanation and critical interpretation” of, in this case, “the Word spoken by God.”
Princeton Theological Seminary has a Department of Practical Theology. This is what the Seminary has to say about practical theology and the mission of this department: “The Seminary’s mission is to prepare women and men to serve Jesus Christ in ministries marked by faith, integrity, scholarship, competence, compassion, and joy, equipping them for leadership worldwide in congregations and the larger church, in classrooms and the academy, and in the public arena.” That is, practical theology has to do with “where the rubber hits the road.”
If dogmatics is “exactly halfway” between exegesis and practical theology then one can see dogmatics at taking the model of the Church and transforming it into practice.
I use the term “model” here because “model building” is exactly what people do when they construct a “worldview” and that is what people, pupils or teachers, do when they go about exegesis. These people attempt to “explain” and “critically interpret” the Word of God. That is, they are building a “model”.
This model can, and should, be used in problem solving and decision making. That is what humans do best. A model is something that helps us to solve more and more difficult problems and to make better decisions.
Dogmatics represents an attempt to take a model and turn it into the proclamation of God so that it is used in solving problems and making decisions. Exegesis can become sterile and “other-worldly”. It can become useless in the sense that it bears no relationship to the lives that people have to live.
Dogmatics, as Barth is defines it, seeks to keep the proclamation of God relevant to lives, to make it useful, to change lives.
The proclamation of God has to do with what we do. Therefore, it must be alive and vital and meaningful. If the proclamation of God becomes irrelevant to the needs of people to problem solve and make decisions in the world they live in, they will seek other “models”.
Barth writes, “Outwardly, dogmatics arises from the fact that the Church’s proclamation is in danger of going astray. Dogmatics is the testing of Church doctrine and proclamation.”
We must continually “test” the relationship between exegesis and practical theology.
“The correction, the deepening, the increasing precision of what is taught in our Church can only be God’s own work although not apart from man’s effort. “
Thus, the question must always be, “What is the evidence?”
“Not the evidence of my thoughts, or my heart, but the evidence of the apostles and prophets, as the evidence of God’s self-evidence.”
I like the phrase that Stanley Hauerwas used for the title of his Gifford lectures, “With the Grain of the Universe.” This, to me, gives us the ultimate test of the proclamation of the Gospel. God’s Word should bring us into greater unity with His creation. If our speech and our actions conform with God’s Word then we should be in unity with His creation and we should feel this because our actions are “with the grain of the universe.” We are moving “with” creation and are not acting “across the grain” of the universe.
If our actions are not with the grain of the universe…we become dis-satisfied, and anxious and, sometimes, alienated. Things just don’t feel right.
This is why our “practical theology” must be in line with our exegesis. This is why we must continually test the waters. And, in this sense, this is why “dogmatics” is pragmatic. It must work. It must bring into alignment with the grain of the universe.
Models are abstractions. Yes, we believe that we have received “the Word of God,” but explaining the Word of God and critically interpreting how it can be put into practice depends upon human beings. And, human beings never have the luxury to work with “complete information.” That is, humans never have the whole story.
Thus, our models, which are abstractions, are partial and therefore ultimately fallible. We must continually test our models and test the results of applying our models. This, I believe, is what Barth is teaching us. We must continually bridge the gap between exegesis and our actions. To Barth, dogmatics is the way that we do this.
Showing posts with label Stanley Hauerwas. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Stanley Hauerwas. Show all posts
Friday, October 15, 2010
Friday, September 24, 2010
Pragmatism and Belief
My comments today are related to the Gifford Lectures of Stanley Hauerwas which were printed in book form under the title of “With the Grain of the Universe.” (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001) What particularly strikes me in the lectures is the juxtaposition of the three individuals Hauerwas focuses upon in the lectures: William James, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth.
These three thinkers, I believe, are representative of the point that Hauerwas wants to make in the lectures concerning the outcome of the debate over modernity. He begins with William James, for James, the pragmatist, follows the path of “experience.” That is, pragmatists apply the “scientific model” to their thinking process, which in a more general form can be referred to as Inductive Inference.
Inductive Inference is a process of “model” testing that always ends up comparing the predictions of a particular model against the outcomes of the decisions an individual has actually pursued. Thus, “experience” is an important part of the process.
I use the term model here as a “catch all” term that includes not only formal models used in making forecasts but also the less formal or less explicit means people use in decision making or problem solving like stories, rules of thumb, or other narrative forms.
If the outcomes are consistent with the predictions then an individual can continue to use the model in its current form. However, if the outcomes are not consistent with the predictions, then the model needs to be modified in order to make better predictions the next time the individual needs to use the model.
Note that not all models directly need to result in a “decision” or an “action”. Models are use to “explain” things, like historical events or how things fit together. Models are also the tools that humans use to try and make sense of things, to present a worldview, or to justify an action.
Models, whether formal or informal in nature, begin with assumptions. That is, assumptions must be made that serve as the foundational material for the construction of the model. The assumptions may be realistic…or they may not be realistic. And, this is where problems come into the picture.
Milton Friedman, the well-known Nobel prize winning economist, wrote, in a very famous essay on “positive economics”, that the reality of the assumptions of a model were really not the issue concerning the value or usefulness of a model. The usefulness of the model was determined by how well the model forecast or how well the model was able to explain events. Just to change a model on the basis that the assumptions of the model were unrealistic was not sufficient.
The Catholic theologian David Tracy has written that the deciding factor about models is their “relative adequacy.” By “relative adequacy” Tracy meant that a model was logically consistent and predicted at least as well as did any other logically consistent theory. The choice of assumptions has a lot to do with whether or not the model is logically consistent. The real “test” of the mode was its ability to predict.
Pragmatism, however, can get caught up in a concern about reality, about a person’s “experience”. The essence of pragmatism is that it works, it helps people solve more and more difficult problems, make better decisions, and it helps people understand history better. The primary focus, therefore, needs to be on the results.
On the other hand, people can transfer their focus to the assumptions of a model. People can look at the assumptions and say that the assumptions don’t conform to reality…to “experience.” Thus, even though the models may be helpful and contribute to successful decision making and problem solving, people may try to change the assumptions because they are not “realistic.” This is where trouble can creep in.
Once people begin focusing upon the assumptions of a model, generally the questioning of the reality of the assumptions will continue. The only place this process can end up is where all the assumptions are “realistic” and that usually leaves you with a model that predicts little or nothing.
This, to me, is what Hauerwas is getting at in his criticisms of modernity. The thinkers of modernity have focused upon the realism of the assumptions of models because they do not conform to their “experience” and so “water-down” models regardless of whether or not they make good predictions. And, this has very significant consequences for their thinking. All models turn out to be deficient. That is, there is no “truth”.
Hauerwas contends that Protestant liberals attempt to ground their knowledge of God in experience…in reality. (page 158) This grounding has led to their questioning the assumptions of the more “orthodox” Reformation model of Christian thinking. True to modernity, once the questioning of assumptions begins, the questioning continues and the model begins to deteriorate. Oh, yes, the “realism” brought into the discussion seems to be called for and, at least in the short run, seems to make the model more consistent with reality. However, once the challenge to the model becomes paramount the result is a kind of nihilism.
The problem is that the focus on the model has shifted from the ability of the model to help solve more and more difficult problems or allow for better decisions to be made. The focus of the model is now on the realism of the model.
This leads Hauerwas to conclude that “the difference between Niebuhr and Barth is exactly the difference between a theology that has given up on its ability to tell us the way the world is and a theology that confidently and unapologetically proclaims the way things are.” (page 21)
Within this context, the Protestant liberal bets all his/her cards on “reason” or the following of “humanistic” ends, and loses the skill to make known to themselves and to make known to others exactly what they believe about how the world works and how things are.
Barth, Hauerwas contends, “did not try to ‘explain’ the truth of what Christians believe about God and God’s creation. He understood that such an explanation could not help but give the impression that the explanation is more important than the witness.” (page 146)
To Hauerwas, “Barth’s convictions were tested by their ability to sustain service to God.” (page 40) That is, the test of any set of convictions, the test of any model is “does it work in practice.” In this case, the test of the convictions is in witness!
“Christians can be no more than witnesses.” (page 16)
Thus, the models people rely on must work. Focus must not be upon the assumptions or the reality behind the assumptions…focus must be upon the consequences of having faith in the model.
It is easy to destroy people’s belief by challenging the reality behind that belief. Modernity has been very good at this. In fact, that is the one thing that modernity excels in.
But, this does not make all models of equal value. Some models predict better than other models. Some models, as David Tracy contend, are relatively adequate. Some of these models are integral to the Christian story and Christian history. We need to have faith in these models if we are to solve more and more difficult problems and to make better decisions. That is the experience that really counts.
These three thinkers, I believe, are representative of the point that Hauerwas wants to make in the lectures concerning the outcome of the debate over modernity. He begins with William James, for James, the pragmatist, follows the path of “experience.” That is, pragmatists apply the “scientific model” to their thinking process, which in a more general form can be referred to as Inductive Inference.
Inductive Inference is a process of “model” testing that always ends up comparing the predictions of a particular model against the outcomes of the decisions an individual has actually pursued. Thus, “experience” is an important part of the process.
I use the term model here as a “catch all” term that includes not only formal models used in making forecasts but also the less formal or less explicit means people use in decision making or problem solving like stories, rules of thumb, or other narrative forms.
If the outcomes are consistent with the predictions then an individual can continue to use the model in its current form. However, if the outcomes are not consistent with the predictions, then the model needs to be modified in order to make better predictions the next time the individual needs to use the model.
Note that not all models directly need to result in a “decision” or an “action”. Models are use to “explain” things, like historical events or how things fit together. Models are also the tools that humans use to try and make sense of things, to present a worldview, or to justify an action.
Models, whether formal or informal in nature, begin with assumptions. That is, assumptions must be made that serve as the foundational material for the construction of the model. The assumptions may be realistic…or they may not be realistic. And, this is where problems come into the picture.
Milton Friedman, the well-known Nobel prize winning economist, wrote, in a very famous essay on “positive economics”, that the reality of the assumptions of a model were really not the issue concerning the value or usefulness of a model. The usefulness of the model was determined by how well the model forecast or how well the model was able to explain events. Just to change a model on the basis that the assumptions of the model were unrealistic was not sufficient.
The Catholic theologian David Tracy has written that the deciding factor about models is their “relative adequacy.” By “relative adequacy” Tracy meant that a model was logically consistent and predicted at least as well as did any other logically consistent theory. The choice of assumptions has a lot to do with whether or not the model is logically consistent. The real “test” of the mode was its ability to predict.
Pragmatism, however, can get caught up in a concern about reality, about a person’s “experience”. The essence of pragmatism is that it works, it helps people solve more and more difficult problems, make better decisions, and it helps people understand history better. The primary focus, therefore, needs to be on the results.
On the other hand, people can transfer their focus to the assumptions of a model. People can look at the assumptions and say that the assumptions don’t conform to reality…to “experience.” Thus, even though the models may be helpful and contribute to successful decision making and problem solving, people may try to change the assumptions because they are not “realistic.” This is where trouble can creep in.
Once people begin focusing upon the assumptions of a model, generally the questioning of the reality of the assumptions will continue. The only place this process can end up is where all the assumptions are “realistic” and that usually leaves you with a model that predicts little or nothing.
This, to me, is what Hauerwas is getting at in his criticisms of modernity. The thinkers of modernity have focused upon the realism of the assumptions of models because they do not conform to their “experience” and so “water-down” models regardless of whether or not they make good predictions. And, this has very significant consequences for their thinking. All models turn out to be deficient. That is, there is no “truth”.
Hauerwas contends that Protestant liberals attempt to ground their knowledge of God in experience…in reality. (page 158) This grounding has led to their questioning the assumptions of the more “orthodox” Reformation model of Christian thinking. True to modernity, once the questioning of assumptions begins, the questioning continues and the model begins to deteriorate. Oh, yes, the “realism” brought into the discussion seems to be called for and, at least in the short run, seems to make the model more consistent with reality. However, once the challenge to the model becomes paramount the result is a kind of nihilism.
The problem is that the focus on the model has shifted from the ability of the model to help solve more and more difficult problems or allow for better decisions to be made. The focus of the model is now on the realism of the model.
This leads Hauerwas to conclude that “the difference between Niebuhr and Barth is exactly the difference between a theology that has given up on its ability to tell us the way the world is and a theology that confidently and unapologetically proclaims the way things are.” (page 21)
Within this context, the Protestant liberal bets all his/her cards on “reason” or the following of “humanistic” ends, and loses the skill to make known to themselves and to make known to others exactly what they believe about how the world works and how things are.
Barth, Hauerwas contends, “did not try to ‘explain’ the truth of what Christians believe about God and God’s creation. He understood that such an explanation could not help but give the impression that the explanation is more important than the witness.” (page 146)
To Hauerwas, “Barth’s convictions were tested by their ability to sustain service to God.” (page 40) That is, the test of any set of convictions, the test of any model is “does it work in practice.” In this case, the test of the convictions is in witness!
“Christians can be no more than witnesses.” (page 16)
Thus, the models people rely on must work. Focus must not be upon the assumptions or the reality behind the assumptions…focus must be upon the consequences of having faith in the model.
It is easy to destroy people’s belief by challenging the reality behind that belief. Modernity has been very good at this. In fact, that is the one thing that modernity excels in.
But, this does not make all models of equal value. Some models predict better than other models. Some models, as David Tracy contend, are relatively adequate. Some of these models are integral to the Christian story and Christian history. We need to have faith in these models if we are to solve more and more difficult problems and to make better decisions. That is the experience that really counts.
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