My comments today are related to the Gifford Lectures of Stanley Hauerwas which were printed in book form under the title of “With the Grain of the Universe.” (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001) What particularly strikes me in the lectures is the juxtaposition of the three individuals Hauerwas focuses upon in the lectures: William James, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth.
These three thinkers, I believe, are representative of the point that Hauerwas wants to make in the lectures concerning the outcome of the debate over modernity. He begins with William James, for James, the pragmatist, follows the path of “experience.” That is, pragmatists apply the “scientific model” to their thinking process, which in a more general form can be referred to as Inductive Inference.
Inductive Inference is a process of “model” testing that always ends up comparing the predictions of a particular model against the outcomes of the decisions an individual has actually pursued. Thus, “experience” is an important part of the process.
I use the term model here as a “catch all” term that includes not only formal models used in making forecasts but also the less formal or less explicit means people use in decision making or problem solving like stories, rules of thumb, or other narrative forms.
If the outcomes are consistent with the predictions then an individual can continue to use the model in its current form. However, if the outcomes are not consistent with the predictions, then the model needs to be modified in order to make better predictions the next time the individual needs to use the model.
Note that not all models directly need to result in a “decision” or an “action”. Models are use to “explain” things, like historical events or how things fit together. Models are also the tools that humans use to try and make sense of things, to present a worldview, or to justify an action.
Models, whether formal or informal in nature, begin with assumptions. That is, assumptions must be made that serve as the foundational material for the construction of the model. The assumptions may be realistic…or they may not be realistic. And, this is where problems come into the picture.
Milton Friedman, the well-known Nobel prize winning economist, wrote, in a very famous essay on “positive economics”, that the reality of the assumptions of a model were really not the issue concerning the value or usefulness of a model. The usefulness of the model was determined by how well the model forecast or how well the model was able to explain events. Just to change a model on the basis that the assumptions of the model were unrealistic was not sufficient.
The Catholic theologian David Tracy has written that the deciding factor about models is their “relative adequacy.” By “relative adequacy” Tracy meant that a model was logically consistent and predicted at least as well as did any other logically consistent theory. The choice of assumptions has a lot to do with whether or not the model is logically consistent. The real “test” of the mode was its ability to predict.
Pragmatism, however, can get caught up in a concern about reality, about a person’s “experience”. The essence of pragmatism is that it works, it helps people solve more and more difficult problems, make better decisions, and it helps people understand history better. The primary focus, therefore, needs to be on the results.
On the other hand, people can transfer their focus to the assumptions of a model. People can look at the assumptions and say that the assumptions don’t conform to reality…to “experience.” Thus, even though the models may be helpful and contribute to successful decision making and problem solving, people may try to change the assumptions because they are not “realistic.” This is where trouble can creep in.
Once people begin focusing upon the assumptions of a model, generally the questioning of the reality of the assumptions will continue. The only place this process can end up is where all the assumptions are “realistic” and that usually leaves you with a model that predicts little or nothing.
This, to me, is what Hauerwas is getting at in his criticisms of modernity. The thinkers of modernity have focused upon the realism of the assumptions of models because they do not conform to their “experience” and so “water-down” models regardless of whether or not they make good predictions. And, this has very significant consequences for their thinking. All models turn out to be deficient. That is, there is no “truth”.
Hauerwas contends that Protestant liberals attempt to ground their knowledge of God in experience…in reality. (page 158) This grounding has led to their questioning the assumptions of the more “orthodox” Reformation model of Christian thinking. True to modernity, once the questioning of assumptions begins, the questioning continues and the model begins to deteriorate. Oh, yes, the “realism” brought into the discussion seems to be called for and, at least in the short run, seems to make the model more consistent with reality. However, once the challenge to the model becomes paramount the result is a kind of nihilism.
The problem is that the focus on the model has shifted from the ability of the model to help solve more and more difficult problems or allow for better decisions to be made. The focus of the model is now on the realism of the model.
This leads Hauerwas to conclude that “the difference between Niebuhr and Barth is exactly the difference between a theology that has given up on its ability to tell us the way the world is and a theology that confidently and unapologetically proclaims the way things are.” (page 21)
Within this context, the Protestant liberal bets all his/her cards on “reason” or the following of “humanistic” ends, and loses the skill to make known to themselves and to make known to others exactly what they believe about how the world works and how things are.
Barth, Hauerwas contends, “did not try to ‘explain’ the truth of what Christians believe about God and God’s creation. He understood that such an explanation could not help but give the impression that the explanation is more important than the witness.” (page 146)
To Hauerwas, “Barth’s convictions were tested by their ability to sustain service to God.” (page 40) That is, the test of any set of convictions, the test of any model is “does it work in practice.” In this case, the test of the convictions is in witness!
“Christians can be no more than witnesses.” (page 16)
Thus, the models people rely on must work. Focus must not be upon the assumptions or the reality behind the assumptions…focus must be upon the consequences of having faith in the model.
It is easy to destroy people’s belief by challenging the reality behind that belief. Modernity has been very good at this. In fact, that is the one thing that modernity excels in.
But, this does not make all models of equal value. Some models predict better than other models. Some models, as David Tracy contend, are relatively adequate. Some of these models are integral to the Christian story and Christian history. We need to have faith in these models if we are to solve more and more difficult problems and to make better decisions. That is the experience that really counts.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Pragmatism and Belief
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